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Levine constructs a model that captures the two-  Levine not only reconciles more empirical
way nature of the relationship between financial  regularities than past theoretical studies have
and economic development - and allows  done, but highlights the role of public policies on
societies at different levels of economic develop-  financial activities. Policy has important implica-
ment and with different policies to choose  tions for the rate of economic growth, the level
different financial services.  of financial development, and the types of
institutions providing financial services.
In this model, various types of financial
contracts and institutions arise in response to the  Levine's model also predicts that per capita
economic environment. Incentives for financial  growth rates should be related to the types of
structures to emerge are generated by liquidity  financial serviccs provided by the financial
and productivity risk, the costs of gathering  scctor. Thus, the most common empirical
information and mobilizing resources, and the  measure of financial development - the overall
costs of financial transactions. The emergence  si7e of the financial system - may not appropri-
and development of financial arrangements in  ately capture fundamental features of financial
response to the economic environment can alter  development.
investment decisions and per capita growth rates
- while the level of per capita income helps
determine  the types of  financial  services  a
particular seciety chooses to develop and use.
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David Gordon.I.  Non-Technical  Summary
A. Motivation
Although a large and growing literature documents some aspects of the relationship
between the evolution of financial markets and economic  development,' economic  theory has
not yet been able to explain many of these empirical regularities  within the context of a single
model. Existing empirical evidence  suggests  at least five stylized facts concerning  the linkages
between financial  development  and long-run growth:
*  As real income uises  the ratio of financial  institutions' assets to fiNP tends to grow;
*  Periods of rapid economic  growth tend to be accompanied  by above-average  rates of
growth in the ratio of financial  institutions' assets to GNP;
*  Rapid growth tends to occur in countries where the financial  system is already large;
*  The distribution  of financial  assets among financial  intermediaries  tends to change in a
common  pattern as per capita income  rises: central  banks typically  become  less important
as income per capita rises, while deposit  banks grow in importance  over an initial range
of income, and then other financial  intermediaries, mutual funds, pension funds, etc.,
surge in importance; but
*  Cotntries at similar income levels display noticeable  differences in the distribution  of
assets across specific  financial  intermediaries,  e.g., deposit  banks compose  a much  larger
share of the financial system in France than in the United Kingdom,  while contractual
savings institutions  are relatively more important  in the U.K.
See Golderr.th  (1969), Gertler and Rose (1991), King and Levine  (1991),
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1991),  and the World Bank (1989).2
These observations  suggest  that a satisfactory  theory of the relationship  between financial
market evolution and economic growth needs to explain how economic growth elicits the
creation and modification  of financial  arrangements while simultaneously  explaining how the
evolving financial structure alters the  incentives of  individuals in  ways  that change the
economy's growth rate.  This paper helps reconcile  theory with the empirical evidence.
B. The Literature and This Paper's Contribution
Recent theoretical  papers by Bencivenga  and Smith (1991), Levine (1991), and Roubini
and Sala-i-Martin  (1991)  have contributed  to our understanding  of how financial  markets affect
growth, 2 but a common  problem with these models is that there is no channel through which
economic growth can stimulate changes in financial markets.  In Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990), however, the level of income per capita helps determine  membership  in an information-
processing  intermediary  that in turn improves  investment  decisions  and economic  growth.
One shortcoming  with all of these models, however, is that agents are either completely
isolated from financial arrangements, or they participate in the totality of financial services
available  within the cont  e  of the specific  models. Across  countries, however, we see financial
markets  providing  a continuum  of services. Apparently,  economies  choose  the types  of financial
services  that they require and can afford given the policies  and legal structures  of the economy.
2  Bencivenga and Smith (1991)  construct a model in which a bank that pools
all of an economy's resources invests  more efficiently than if individuals make
their  own  investment  decisions.  Levine  (1991) shows  how  productivity  and
liquidity  risk may induce equity markets to arise and explores how the resultant
market allocates risk and  alters investment  incentives in  ways  that change steady
state growth rates.  Roubini and Sala-i-Martin  (1991) assume that  financial
services increase economic efficiency,  and then  explore the interactions  between
financial repression, economic growth, and tax evasion.3
This  paper constructs a  model in  which various types of  financial contracts and
institutions  arise in response  to the economic  environment. Incentives  for financial structures
to arise are generated by liquidity and productivity  risk, information  gathering and resource
mobilization  costs, and financial  tiansactions  costs. The emergence  and  development  of financial
arrangements  in response to the economic  environment  can alter investment  decisions  and per
capita growth rates, while the level of per capita income helps determine the iy=  of financial
services that society  chooses to construct  and use.  Thus, not only does this paper capture the
two-way  nature of the relationship  between financial  and economic  development,  it also allows
for societies  at different levels of economic  development  and with different policies to choose
different  financial  services. Thus, this paper helps reconcile  the five stylized  facts listed above.
C. Intuition Underlying the Model
The model  is built on the foundations  of both the "endogenous  growth" literature, which
studies how economic  incentives, production opportunities,  and policies prompt individuals  to
make investment  decisions that determine the rate of economic  growth, and the "endogenous
financial  structures" literature, which studies the emergence  of financial  services in response  to
risk and information  costs. 3
In this paper, per capita output growth only occurs if agents invest a sufficient  amount
of resources  in projects that augment  human  capital  and stimulate  technological  innovation. The
critical inputs into human capital and technology  production are nhysical resources and group
3  The endogenous growth literature is  most closely associated with the work
of Romer  (1986, 1990), Lucas  (1988), and Rebelo  (1991).  On the endogenous
financial structures literature see Townsend  (1978, 1979), Diamond and Dybvig
(1983),  Diamond (1984), and the review by Gertler (1988).4
interactions.  Intuitively, the model captures the notion that human interactions  are a crucial
aspect of inventing  new technologies,  improving  production  processes, and augmenting  human
capital  skills.  Similarly,  physical capital  ean  expedite  technological innovation and
improvements  in human capital.
These human-capital-augmenting  and technology-producing  interactions  occur in "firms,"
where groups of agents invent, innovate, and produce together in a two period production
process. The intuition  behind the two period process is that it takes a "long time" to learn to
communicate  with colleagues, discover areas of  comparative advantage, and then improve
production techniques  and human  capital skills. Furthermore, I assume that physical resources
invested  ir. firms are subject to an extemality:  the average quantity  of resources maintaived  in
firms during the two period production process increases the human capital of each worker
independently  of that individual's own investment of resources.  The ides  underlying this
externality  are that (1) there may  be a public  good characteristic  associated  with resources  within
a "firm", i.e., if I bring a better computer  to work, others can use it when I'm not using it and
thereby improve their own skills; (2) a firm member who benefits from his own additional
capital  investment  will, via interactions  with other firm members,  positively  influence  the human
capital of others even though they did not invest more capital; and (3) there may be a time-
saving  aspect of physical  capital  investment  that promotes  more human  interactions,  i.e., capital
resources invested  by one individual  may allow that individual  to interact more with other firm
members. The physical capital extemality  implies that an individual  who prematurely removes
his capital after one period slows the rate of human capital accumulation  of remaining firm
members and, thereby, slows economic  growth.In addition  to specifying  an environment  in which per capita growth may emerge as the
result of private investment  decisions, the model  has characteristics  that motivate  the creation
of commnnonly  observed financial  services.  Agents may invest in illiquid firms that are subject
to productivity  shocks, or in liquid but less profitable assets that pay-off in one period.  The
liquid asset does not enhance  human capital or technology  and, therefore, does not contribute
to growth.  Firms are termed illiquid because premature removal  of one's capital before firms
complete  production yields a low return.  After making  investment  decisions, some individuals
receive privately observed liquidity shocks whereby they discover that they need to consume
their wealth  before firms complete  the two period production  process. This liquidity risk along
with firm productivity  risk may discourage firm investment. Consequently,  financial  contracts
and institutions  may arise to enhance the liquidity  associated  with investing in firms and allow
investors to diversify against productivity  shocks.
Another  element of the model  that can elicit the creation of financial  intermediaries  is the
cost associated  with identifying  and exploiting  profitable investment  opportunities. The paper
assumes  that there are research costs associated  with identifying  which  firms are good and which
firms have less profitable futures.  Similarly, the paper assumes that it is costly to mobilize
resources for firms.  These costs include setting up organizations,  communicating  with clients,
keeping accounts, enforcing  contracts, and certifying  the viability and profitability  of relatively
unknown firms.  An intermediary  that identifies worthy projects for investors and mobilizes
resources for firms could improve resource allocation and accelerate economic growth.  The
costs to providing some  financial  services, however, may be too high for many investors  to pay
and therefore unprofitable  for financial intermediaries  to provide.  I examine a simple cost6
structure, such that individual investors have to pay a fee each period to purchase financial
intermediary services.  This cost structure implies thaw  the level of income per capita helps
determine the types of fnancial services constructed  and used by economies.  Put differently,
growth can influence  the types financial  services  found in an economy  by making the provision
of financial  services profitable  and the purchase of these services affordable.
The financial  structures  that may arise in this model - depending  on policy, transactions
costs, and the level of income per capita - affect growth via two channels.  First, financial
services can increase the fraction of resources devoted to long-run endeavors that augment
human capital and technology.  Specifically, financial structures can raise the fraction of
resources  devoted  to firms by reducing  the liquidity  and productivity  risk associated  with firms,
by providing  investors with better information  about firms, and by mobilizing  capital resources
for firms.  A second channel via which financial arrangements may affect growth is by
eliminating the  premature liquidation of  firm capital.  Financial structures can eliminate
premature capital liquidation by allowing investors that receive liquidity shocks and require
access to their assets quickly to trade - either directly through equity markets or indirectly
through financial intermediaries  - with individuals that do not require quick access to their
assets. In this way, investors  requiring  quick access to their wealth  do not prematurely  liquidate
firm capital.  Because of  the physical resource externality in  firm production, premature
liquidation of firm capital reduces the rate of human capital augmentation  and technological
advancement  occurring within firms.  Financial structures that eliminate premature capital
liquidation  improve the productive efficiency  of firms for any level of initial firm investment,7
and the economy  growvs  faster.  Thus, financial  services  can accelerate  growth by (1) improving
the allocation  of capital and (2) enhancing  the productivity  of firms.
D. Policy and Empirical Predictions
This paper helps  explain the five stylized  facts presented  above and also makes empirical
predictions that can be studied in future research.  In this paper, financial development and
economic growth  occur  simultaneously.  Financial services  promote efficient  resource
mobilization  and allocation  and can eliminate  costly  disruptions  to the production  process. These
services encourage economic growth.  Similarly, increases in per capita income make more
sophisticated  types of financial  services  affordable. Thus, economic  growth stimulates  financial
development in this model, so that growing economies  will choose more advanced forms of
financial  services as they develop. In addition, the model  contains threshold  levels of income,
such that when a country passes these discrete income levels, more sophisticated  types of
financial  services  become  affordable  and the country grows faster.  Thus, the model  takes some
steps toward explaining  the observation  first made by Goldsmith  (1969) that periods of rapid
economic  growth are accompanied  by rapid financial  development.
Public policy toward financial  services has important  implications  in this model for the
rate of economic growth, the level of financial development, and the types of  institutions
providing  financial  services. Taxing or impeding  financial  intermediaries  in this model  reduces
the rate of economic  growth and stymies  financial  development. In addition,  public policies  that
indirectly  raise the costs of evaluating  firms  and coordinating  capital financing  fo  r firms will also
retard the development  and restrict the functioning  of financial  intermediaries  that improve the8
efficiency  with which  society  allocates  resources  and prodv  ces goods. Thus, an inefficient  legal
system,  poor accounting  standards,  macroeconomic  instability,  and poor regulatory  institutions
may thwart both financial  and economic  development. This paper does not, however, explore
reasons why authorities choose to tax and repress financial  intermediaries. This optinal tax
question is examined  by Roubi::i  and Sala-i-Martin  (1991)  and Bencivenga  and Smith (1990).
Public policies  may also influence  the types  of financial  institutions  that provide financial
services. For example, taxes on equity  transacrions  or distortionary  taxes on capital  gains could
restrict stock  market participation  and encourage  banks, informal  financial  houses, and financial
divisions of  corporations to provide financial services.  Similarly, directed credit policies,
interest rate controls, and distortionary  taxation  of debt could reduce the effectiveness  of banks
and encourage the formation  of other types of financial  intermediaries. Thus, policy will not
only help in determining whether or  not financial services are provided, policy may also
importantiy  shape the types of financial  structures  that arise to manage  risk, reduce transactions
costs, and mobilize  and allocate  resources.
An important  prediction  from the model  is that per capita growth rates are related to the
types of financial services provided by the financial sector: financial structures that manage
liquidity and productivity  risk, reduce transactions  costs, and augment  the information  content
of investment  decisions  increase the efficient  allocation  of resources, the productivity  of fimis,
and therefore economic growth.  Thus, the  most common empirical measure of  financial
development  - the  overall  size  of  the  financial  system  - may  not  appropriately  capture
fundamental  features  of financial  development. This paper suggests that empirical work should
focus on developing  indicators of the provision of financial  services, not simply  measuring the9
size of the financial  system. Some preliminary  results in King and Levine (1991) suggest that
this distinction  is empi,ically i-nportant.
I'he  remainder of this paper provides a  fairly rigorous treatment of what has been
discussed in this r.on-technical  summary.  The next section &escribes  the ei.oogenous  growth
model and the incentives generating financial  services.  Section III studies the emergencL  of
financial structures that enhance firm liq.uidity,  allow agents to diversify against productivity
risk, and lower financial  transactions  custs.  In addition, the section  evaluates  the implications
of these iinancial services and public policy on resource allocation and growth.  This section
enmphasizes  the role that financial  services  can play in economic  development. It does not focus
on the precise institutional  forms that may arise ir different  countries  to perform thesc services.
The section does, however, discuss how public policy can shape the types of institutions  that
provide financial  services.  Section  IV examines  the emergence of financial  intermediaries  that
research  production  processes,  identify  and verify externalities,  and mobilize  resources to exploit
profitable opportunities. The role and implications  of policy are also discussed.  Section V
concludes.10
II.  The Model
This section presents an endogenous  growth model based on Levine (1991).  Liquidity
risk, productivity risk, information  gathering and resource mobilization  costs, and financial
transactions  costs generate  a demand for financial  services. in addition, the level of income per
capita may affect the affordability  and provision of financial  services.  Later sections study (1)
the emergence of  financial contracts, markets, and institutions, (2) the resultant effects of
financial  arrangements  on steady state gr(uwth,  and (3) the manner in which economic  growth
can affect the emergence  of different  financial  intermediaries.
A.  Preferences and Endowments
The economy  consists  of an infinite  sequence  of agents that live for three periods. There
is no population  growth; in each period, indexed by t=O, 1,2,..., a continuum  of identical  agents
of measure one is born with the utility function
I  C2 +  c 3 C( U(C 1,  C 2 1  C 3)  =  - -,  where y  > 0.(1
Consumption  at age i is c1, and the coefficient  of relative risk aversion is y+ 1. Since agents do
not value age 1 consumption,  they save all age I income.11
The agent-specific,  privately observed random variable so  is revealed at the start of the
second period of life, and has the probability  distribution
0  wi th  probabil  ty  1 -(2)
1  wi th  probabi  1  i ty 
The preference  and risk structure  defined  by equations  (1) and (2) imply that agents care about
the ability to cc ;sume their wealth at age 2 because they may receive po=O  and therefore not
value age 3 consumption. Consequently,  there is a "desire for liquidity."  The uncertainty
associated with being a  "type 0"  (sp=0) is  "liquidity risk."  If each individual's type were
publicly observable, standard insurance contracts contingent on  each agent's  type would
eliminate liquidity risk.  Since  types  are  not  publicly verifiable,  alten.ative  financial
arrangements  may arise to mitigate  liquidity  risk.
Age 1 agents are endowed  with one unit of labor that they supply  inelastically  to firms.
B. Technology
Each  period,  groups of agents - "firms"  - produce a commodity  that can be used as
capital, consumed  immediately,  or stored and consumed  in the next period.12
Production  is a two-stage,  two-period  process. During the first stage, individuals  invent
production processes and improve human capital. 3 During the second stage, firms produce
commodities.
Formally, an agent born at t works for age 3 entrepreneurs,  receives  wage w,, stores (1-
q) of her earnings until t+ 1, and invests the fraction q of age 1 income (qw,)  in a firm.  The
human capital augmentation  function is
ht+H2  7  =Ht+(qwt)  1<8,  e<o,  (3)
where h is human  capital, H is a constant, qwt is the quantity  of resources invested in the firm
by the individual, and W1+ 2 is the average  quantity  of resources per entrepreneur maintained  in
the firm between t and t+2.  Specifically, W+ 2 (1-c)(w,i)bir,  where cv  is the average fraction
of resources  removed  from the firm at t+ 1,  ,  are average  resources  per entrepreneur  invested
in period t, and 7r  is the fraction  of initial members  remaining  in t+2.
Human capital acquisition  requires that agents interact for two periods [Prescott and
Boyd 1987]. The rate of human  capital acquisition  for an individual  depends  positively on (1)
the amount  of resources invested  by the individual  [King  and Rebelo 1990] and (2) the average
3 Human capital is a non-tradable factor of production representing the
knowledge  and  skills  embodied  in  individuals.  Although  Romer  (1990)
distinguishes technology - the instructions for combining raw materials  into
goods - from human capital - the ability to follow instructions and create new
_nstructions,  this distinction is  unimportant in  this  paper because I  assume that
legal  or technical restrictions imply  that invented  technologies are only  useful
to the firms that create those plans.  Using Romer's terminology, firm-created
technology is perfectly excludable and  therefore economically indistinguishable
from  rival goods such  as human capital.  Thus, I  will use the terms human capital
and technology interchangeably.13
amounit  of physical resources maintained  in the firm for two periods [Levine 1991]. This last
input states that the average  amount of resources in the firm positively  affects the ,.Lman  capital
of each individual  member independently  of that individual's own investment. This physical
resource externality may be the result of a number of effects: (1) there may be a public good
externality  associated  with resources within a firm; (2) a member who benefits from his own
investment  will, via interactions  with other members,  influence  the human  capital of others; (3)
resources invested  by one individual  may allow that individual  to interact more with other firm
members.  The externality implies that investment is  socially sub-optimal.  If  a  financial
intermediary  could coordinate investment, it would internalize  the production externality and
increase  firm investment.
In the second stage of  firm production, age 3 firm members with human capital -
"entrepreneurs"  - hire age I workers to produce consumption  goods (y):
YC+ 2=i  "+ 2ht+ 2 Lt+2  00(  <1,  (4)
where L 1+2 is age 1 labor units hired per entrepreneur  in t+2  and  lt+2 is a firm specific  shock
with an expected value of one. 4 The level of human capital per entrepreneur at t+2  is ht+ 2.
In relation to the standard neoclassical  growth model, h,+ 2 is technology, but in this paper, the
evolution  of technology  is the result of the decisions  of maximizing  agents.
4 For each  firm  v  is  drawn  from  a  distribution  function  on  a  compact
interval, such that min{f} >  1  - e, and the expected value of v  equals 1.14
Only age 3 agents receive  firm profits  because  production  requires  two  periods. Removal
of one's capital after one period yields a low gross return of x consumption  goods per initial
investment  good, where x is less than the return from the storage  technology  (i.e., x < 1). Thus,
firm investment  is illiquid.
The labor market is competitive,  so that labor is paid its expected marginal product,
w,+2  = (  1-  e)  ht+2Lt+0  (5
Thus, the return to each entrepreneur  in firm j is
4r,+2  =  [f11+2  +0-1)  ht+2Lt+2.  (6)
Equation (4), (5), and (6) demonstrate that human capital positively influences production,
wages, and the return to capital.
C. Infonnation and Transactions  Costs
The economic  environment  studied  in this paper has four characteristics  that motivate  the
creation  of financial  structures. First, individuals  face uncertain  liquidity  needs. Consequently,
financial contracts and institutions may arise that allow individuals to reduce liquidity risk.
Second, firm specific  productivity  shocks  create an incentive  for financial structures that help
agents diversify against productivity risk.  Third, there aie costs associated with financial15
transactions.  Thus, intermediaries may arise that reduce the number of transactions.  For
simplicity, I assume that agents can conduct two free asset transactions;  additional  transactions
cost T per trip.  As will become clear, allowing two free transactions is unimportant for the
results.
A fourth element of the model's informational  structure that can elicit the creation of
financial intermediaries is  the  cost  associated with  identifying and  exploiting profitable
investment  opportunities. The model  contains an externality  associated  with physical capital in
the creation of human  capital and technology. The externality  implies that firm investment  is
socially sub-optimal. An intermediary  that identifies  profitable opportunities  and coordinates
investment for  a  firm  could internalize the production externality and  improve resource
allocation. This activity, however, is costly.
I examine  a simple  cost structure  that creates  an important  relationship  between  financial
structure  and economic  growth.  I assume that there is a cost (Z) each period associated  with
researching firms and identifying externalities.  Any individual or  agency can acquire this
information  about all of the productive  processes in the economy  for Z.  An intermediary  that
collects information  for a large number of investors  can reduce the research costs per investor
by spreading  the fixed costs over many investors. Thus, there is an incentive  for intermediaries
to perform researching  activities  for many individuals. In addition, I assume that there are costs
associated  with mobilizing  resources from many  individuals  and coordinating  financing  to exploit
profitable projects. 5 Specifically, mobilization  costs are equal to a constant amount (D per
5  As  discussed  by  Townsend  (1983),  these  costs  may  be  associated  with
setting up organizations,  communicating with clients,  keeping accounts,  and
writing and enforcing contracts.  In  addition, Booth and Smith (1986)  argue that
financial intermediaries certify the viability and profitability of relatively
unknown firms.  The costs involved in  obtaining this information and  effectively16
investor from whom the intermediary  collects funds, or put differently, each investor must pay
r  to  receive  researcher/mobilizer services  in  a  competitive  equilibrium.  Thus,
researcher/mobilizer services cost  less  in  richer countries in  per  capita  income terms.
Consequently,  the level of economic  development  helps  determine  the type  of financial  structures
constructed  and used by an economy.
D.  Trading under Financial Autarky
This section examines  the model without financial  services.  Consider an agent born at
time t.  During the first period of life, she supplies  time to a firm, receives  wage w,, and makes
an investment  decision (q). She invests the proportion  q of her earnings (qw,)  in an illiquid  firm
and stores the remainder  (l-q).  The initial firm investment  is one asset transaction.
At age 2, agents learn their types (p,). The fraction 1-?r  of the generation receives  so-
O  and therefore does not value period 3 consumption.  These type 0 agents regret having
invested in  the firm.  They consume their wealth at age 2:  stored good [(1-q)wj plus the
premature "liquidation"  value of the capital they invested in the firm [xqwj.  This liquidation
is counted as a second asset transaction. Since all type O's liquidate firm capital, the fraction
of resources  removed from firms (<x)  equals the fraction  of the population  that are type 0 (1-X).
Thus, the average  quantity  of resources maintained  in firms for two periods (W,+2) is lower than
it would be if capital were not removed from firms prematurely.  Because of the externality,
type 0 agents unintentionally  reduce the rate of  human capital accumulation of remaining
members.
communicating  this  information  to  investors  could  be  substantial.Type 1 agents value age 3 consumription  and regret having  stored goods at age 1 because
firms have a higher expected rate of return than storage.  They do not prematurely liquidate
capital and consume only their stored goods at age 2: [(1-q)wJ.  At age three, type 1 agents
complete stage one of firm production, having developed  skills and patents.  They hire age 1
labor, produce goods subject to a productivity  shock, pay labor, and distribute any profits to
remaining  partners based on their initial investments. Thus, type 1 agents consume  rj,+ 2 at age
3.  The distribution  of profits is a second asset transaction.
Note that at age 2, (l-7r) of the population  regrets having invested in the firm [type 0
agents], and r of the population  regrets having stored goods [type 1 agents].  Thus, there is a
positive  role for financial  markets  and institutions  that allow these two types to trade directly or
indirectly.
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E. Equilibrium  under Financial  Auwarky
A representative  agent born at t chooses q to solve the problem
max  E  (1-nt)  [qwtx+  (1-q)  w]  -Y
y
(7)
7c  [ (1-q)  Wt+  4s+-l  +  w  - 2
where E is the expected value operator.  Since 7r  of a generation become  entrepreneurs  and L,
is age  i  labor per  entrepreneur, L, =  1/ir.  Under financial autarky, all  type 0 agents
prematurely  remove firm capital, so that a  =  l-7r.  Thus, in equilibrium
t  =  =  *'  't+2  =  (I-a)  (a)  /  =t  Wtq  (8)
The first order condition  after substituting  (8) and assuming  e +  6 =  1 is6
(1-it)  [X-1J  +  iEE  [  I(Il+0-1)eH i-1]  l  . (9)
[xi  + (1  a  -q)  t e  ay  o  [ov  (f  r  -1a  )close  Hf+  (s1o-)l+yi
6  This  makeB it  easy  to  Bolve  for  a  closed  form  solution.19
The first term in (9) is the increment  to utility if q is marginally  increased  given that the agent
is type 0.  The second term is the expected  increment  to utility if q is marginally  increased  given
that the agent is type 1'
Re-write (9)
(1-70  [X-1]  7  [eeH  -i]
[xq+  (I-q)  I "Y  [OH*qg+  (I  -q)  I  Y
+  rCov  {[q+O-1]eH1Ir-1],  [)  1  =0  .
t (j+0-1)  Hq+  (1 -g)  ]1*YIJ
(10)
Contingent  on the agent being type 1, the last term is the covariance  between the expected return
to  marginally increasing firm investment and the  marginal utility of  consumption.  This
covariance  is always negative.
The first result is that financial  contracts or institutions that allow investors to hold
diversified  portfolios  will induce individuals  to invest more in firms.  To see this, note that the
summation  of the first two terms in (10) varies inversely with q.  Since the covariance is
negative  and becomes  more negative  as the variance of the productivity  shock increases, q - the
fraction of income devoted to firm investment - must fall as the variance of the productivity
shock 'Ancreases. The economic intuition is  that the variance of  the  productivity shock
discourages  risk averse investors  from investing  in firms. Consequently,  financial  structures  that
allow investors to diversify against  productivity  shocks  will induce more firm investment.
7  Since I assumed that the expected  return  from  firm  investment  is  greater
than that of storage which is greater than the premature liquidation value of
firm capital (7reOH'  >  1  >  x  >  0),  there is a solution to (9) where 0 S  q 5 1.20
F. Investment  and Growth under Financial  Autarky
Having established  the influence  of productivity  risk on investment, let the variance of
the productivity  shock equal zero.  Solving  (10) yields
q  =  ,  where  1= !  'c (eR-1)  i'*  R  = F0aI.  (11)
(R-1)  +IL(I  -x)  (1 -I)  (1 -x)
The fraction  of resources allocated  to firms depends  positively on the share of output going to
entrepreneurs  (0), the rate of human capital accumulation  (H), labor per entrepreneur  (O), the
liquidation  value of firm investment  (x), the probability  of being type 1 ('r), and the fraction  of
marginal  returns internalized  by the individual  (e).  Also, the greater the degree of risk aversion
(-y),  the lower is the amount invested  in firms  because there is liquidity  risk associated  with firm
investment.21
The two period growth rate is
=  YtC./Yt  h  ht  =  1&1+ 2 _  W2  )  (12)
Substituting  equilibrium  values and letting A = H(1-0)wO,
gy  = Aq  = A[  (R-1)+  (13)
Per capita growth is tied to human capital accumulation:  the faster the rate of human capital
accumulation,  the faster is the growth rate of per capita output.
G. Discussion
The larger the fraction  of resources devoted  to firms, the higher is the economy's growth
rate.  Thus,  incentives for firm investment increase growth; disincentives discourage it.
Productivity  risk discourages  firm investment  and thereby lowers growEh. Financial contracts
and institutions that allow agents to  hold diversified portfolios reduce productivity risk,
encourage firm investment,  and expedite  per capita growth.  Similarly, financial  arrangements
that ameliorate  liquidity  risk can stimulate  firm investment  and economic  growth. Furthermore,
financial  intermediaries  that allow investors  to internalize  production  externalities  would further22
raise the fraction  of resources allocated  to firms, augmenting  the iate of human  capital creation
and accelerating  per capita income growth.
In addition  to the fraction  of resources  allocated  to firms being an important  determinant
of growth, the economy's growth rate is also a function  of firm productivity. The fraction 1-'r
of the population  removes its capital from firms after one period.  Because of the production
externality, premature capital liquidation reduces the rate of human capital accumulation  of
remairting  firm members  and slows economic  growth.  An institution  or market that minimizes
premature  capital liquidation  would increase  economic  growth for any firm investment  rate by
improving  productive  efficiency.
M. Risk and Transactions Costs:
Equity  Markets  and Simple Financial  Initermediaries
This  section  examines  the  emergence of  equity  markets  and  simple  financial
intermediaries  that mitigate  liquidity and productivity  risk.  In mitigating  risk, these financial
structures alter  investment decisions and improve the efficiency of  firm production.  The
incentives  for equity markets and financial  intermediaries  to form are straightforward:  agents
would like  to  hold  diversified portfolios that  eliminate their  exposure  to  idiosyncratic
productivity  risk; and investors would like to hold assets that are liquid, so that they do not
receive a low return when they require early access to their wealth. Equity markets and simple
financial  intermediaries  allow investors  to hold diversified  portfolios. In addition, they increase23
the liquidity  of firm investment  by - explicitly  in the case of equity markets and implicitly  in the
case of intermediaries  - allowing  agents with different liquidity  needs to trade.
While  reducing  liquidity  risk, equity  markets  and simple  financial  intermediaries  eliminate
the premature withdrawal of  resources from firms.  This  increases firm efficiency and
accelerates growth.  Furthermore, when agents are sufficiently  risk averse, the reduction in
productivity  and liquidity  risk increases  the frax.ion  of resources devoted  to firms which  further
speeds  growth.
There are, however, transactions  costs associated  with equity transactions. The fraction
[1-ir]  of the populat;on  goes to the market twice, while the fraction 7r  goes three times.  Thus,
expected  transactions  costs at age 1  are 7rT.  The intcrmediaries  introduced  in this section  reduce
transactions  costs.  The intermediaries  are termed "simple" because they do not improve the
informational  content manifest in society's investment  decisions. More sophisticated  financial
intermediaries  are studied in the next section.
It should  also be emphasized  that  this paper focuses  on the provision  of financial  services,
not on explicitly  characterizing  the institutions  that provide financial  services. Thus, while the
presentation  is done in the context of equity markets  and deposit  taking  financial  intermediaries,
this paper says little about the precise form of contracts  and institutions. I do, however, discuss
how different looking institutional  structures could provide similar financial services and also
describe how public policy may shape the existence  and form of financial  institutions.24
A. Trading  and the Emergence  of Equity Markets
Financial  transactions  take place in the first part of each period and other activities  occur
in the second part.  During age 1, agents create firms and distribute shares.  At age 2, agents
learn their types.  The resulting heterogeneity  creates an incentive  for financial  transactions.
At age 2, agents know the amount  of claims  each has on period three consumption  goods
and the quantity  of consumption  goods stored from period 1.  Let P equal the period 2 price of
claims to period 3 goods, i.e., how many stored goods one has to pay for a claim to a period
3 good.  Type 0 agents will sell their claims to period 3 consumption  goods as long as they
receive  a return at least equal to the liquidation  value  of their firm investment,  x.  Type 1 agents
will purchase period three consumption  goods with their stored goods as long as the price of
period three consumption  goods in terms of stored consumption  goods (P) is less than one.
The solution is greatly simplified  by establishing  the following  result:
Eroposition  1: if  E7rR >  I  > x,  where R  = R7r 4,  then
(i)  No resources  are prematurely removed  from firms; and
(ii) all stored  goods are consumed  by type 0 agents.
Proof:  See Levine 1991.
Proposition 1 states that as long as the expected return from firm investment  (eiR ) is greater
than the storage return (1) which is in turn larger than the liquidation  return (x), no resources
will te prematurely liquidated  and all stored goods are consumed  by agents that do not value
period 3 consumption. 8
8  If  the condition for Proposition 1 is  violated  a  relatively  uninteresting
corner solution  results: if the  return from  storage is  higher than expected firm
returns, there would be no firm investment.  If  the premature liquidation return
is higher than storage, there would be no storage.25
The major implication  of Proposition 1 is that no firm capital is prematurely liquidated;
thus (1-a) = 1, so that W1+ 2 =  wtq'/7r. This implies that the rate of human  capital  accumulation
will be higher for any given investment  rate than in the financially  autarkic economy.
Assuming  that agents hold diversified  portfolios,  agents choose q' to maximize  expected
utility, where the superscript "*" is used to designate the investment  allocation decision with
equity markets:
max  - [  [(1-q*)wwt  + Pn("HWt 6
2(qw*)  ]w
(14)
-L.8jbtOEIINw+ 2 (q*  wt)  e  +  (1-q')  wt  _ V
If transactions costs are sufficiently large, agents will choose not to create and use equity
markets; the economy will resort to the financially  autarkic equilibrium  studied in Section I.
Thus, public policies  that raise transactions  costs could inhibit the formation  and functioning  of
capital markets. 9
The intuition  behind the proof in  Levine (1991)  is straightforward: (1)  if
agents expect capital to be liquidated, the expected price of period 3 goods in
period 2 (P)  must be so low that all agents would increase the fraction of goods
stored (until  no goods  are prematurely liquidated); (2)  if  at age 1  agents expect
to consume stored goods even if they are type 1, the price of period 3 goods ir
terms of period 2 goods  must be so  high that agents  would store less  goods (until
no stored goods are consumed by type 1 agents).  Thus, the requirement of a
rational expectations equilibrium yields Proposition 1.
9  Levine (1991)  studies the implications of income taxes, corporate taxes,
capital  gains taxes,  and consumption  taxes  on the  provision  of financial  services
and the rate of per capita output growth.26
B. The Investment  Decision and Growth  with Equity Markets
Taking the first condition  of (14) and simplifying  yields
eiCR*P  = 1.  (15)
To solve for q  conjecture that
(1-g7)  (16)
(l1-i  ) R*q'
substitute  (16) into (15) to obtain q
q  =  es  (17)
1 -7  +ent
Levine (1991) formally demonstrates that this q  and P  represent a  rational expectations
equilibrium.  1 0
Equation  (17) specifies  the fraction  of resources  devoted  to firm investment  when society
chooses to create equity markets. In comparing  the investment  decision  in the presence  of equity
10  To  see  this  is  a  rational  expectations  equilibrium  note  that  (1)
Proposition 1  establishes that this P clears the equity market in  period 2 given
period  1  investment  decisions;  (2)  Proposition  1  establishes  the  optimal
consumption/investment decision of type 0 and 1 agents in period 2, whic4 are
consitent with this P and q  combination; (3) the investment decision, q , is
optimal given P and the first order condition from (14); and (4) substitution
demonstrates that this P and q clear the market in period one.  Satisfaction of
these conditions represent a rational expectations equilibrium.27
markets (17) with the investment  decision in the absence  of equity markets (11), note that there
are parameterizations  of the model such that without  equity markets no firm investment  occurs,
but the emergence of equity markets alone changes incentives  sufficiently, so that individuals
invest in firms and the economy grows.  Thus, policies that stymie the evolution of capital
markets may  retard technological  innovation,  human  capital  augmentation,  and economic  growth.
The per capita growth rate of the economy is
g=  An-bq'
=  Aq  (18)
1.  -7C  +eTC
Equations  (17) and (18) demonstrate  the two channels  through which the emergence of
equity markets can stimulate  growth.  The first channel  is enhanced  productive  efficiency. By
allowing agents to manage liquidity risk, equity markets eliminate the premature removal of
capital from firms.  The maintenance  of more resources in firms increases the rate of human
capital accumulation  because of the physical resoui._e  externality  in human capital production.
The faster rate of human capital augmentation  enhances firm productivity  and the rate of per
capita income  growth. Thus, even  if q =  q', the growth  rate with equity markets is greater than
under financial  autarky, i.e.,  A  >  A by 7r4.
The second channel through which equity markets can affect growth is the allocation
channel. By reducing  the liquidity  and productivity  risk associated  with firm investment,  equity
markets can increase the fraction of resources devoted to firms over the financially  autarkic28
allocation. The larger the fraction of resources devoted to firms, the higher is the economy's
growth rate.
Equity markets do not, however, allow investors to internalize production externalities
into their investment  decisions. Furthermore, equity markets require more transactions  than in
financial  autarky.
C.  Simple" Financial Intermediaries
This section shows how financial  intermediaries  can reduce transactions costs.  These
intermediaries may issue demand deposits and make loans, or  issue equity and purchase
ownership  claims, or have a mixture  of financial  instruments  as assets and liabilities. Although
I will model  these intermediaries  as deposit  taking institutions,  this paper does not examine the
differences between debt and equity contracts," and many institutional forms could provide
financial  services that manage  liquidity  and productivity  risk and reduce transactions  costs.
Intermediaries  take deposits from age 1 individuals  and invest directly in the storage
technology  and a diversified  portfoiio of firms.' 2 A demand deposit is defined as contract that
requires an initial investment  at age 1 and promises  a return of r' at age 2 or r2 at age 3 at the
discretion of the depositor.  Let intermediaries  offer depositors
11  See  Townsend  (1979),  Stiglitz  (1989),  and  Seward  (1990).
12  The storage technology may be viewed as "reserves" and  investment in
firms may be in the form of loans.29
1 - it  + es;
(19)
2  R *e_ r  =
These return are equal to the equilibrium  returns in the presence of equity markets except that
r2 is greater in this banking  economy  by r because  transactions  costs are lower. Each agent only
conducts two transactions:  deposit  and withdrawal. In the equity market equilibrium  7r  percent
of the population  transact three times.
In mimicking equity markets, these simple financial intermediaries choose the same
allocation of resources, q'.  Thus, emergence of these simple intermediaries  has the same
fundamental  influences  on productive  efficiency, investment  decisions, and growth as does the
emergence  of equity markets:  firm  capital  is not  prematurely  liquidated,  and reduced  productivity
and liquidity risk enhance firm investment. Agents  in the simple banking economy, however,
have a higher expected level of  utility than agents in  the equity market economy because
intermediaries  lower the number  of transactions. Neither  of these financial  structures, however,
allows economic  decision makers to internalize  production  externalities.
Different public policies may play an  important role in  determining the  types of
institutions  that perform financial  services across economies. Directed credit policies, interest
rate controls, and taxes on financial  intermediaries  could impede the ability of intermediaries  to
invest optimally and thereby discourage development  of financial institutions.  In this case,
equity markets may play a more prominent  role in allowing investors to pool and trade risk.
Similarly, taxes on equity transactions or capital gains could restrict participation in stock
markets. Under these conditions,  banks, mutual funds, informal finance houses, and even the30
financial divisions of large corporations may play key roles in providing financial services.
Thus, policy will not only help in determining  whether or not financial  services are provided,
public policies may importantly  shape the type of financial  structures that arise to allocate risk
and reduce transactions  costs.
Before concluding, it should be noted that this subsection's equilibrium allocation of
resources is incentive  compatible,  unlike  the banking  allocations  in Diamond  and Dybvig (1983)
and Bencivenga  and Smith (1991).  In those papers, each individual would prefer to invest
directly in  firms rather than in  financial intermediaries, i.e.,  individuals would not join
intermediaries unless they were forced to join." 3 In this paper with no policy distortions,
individuals  voluntarily forgo equity market transactions  and join intermediaries. To see why,
recall that in the equity market economy individuals  rationally expect a given price, P, for
claims to period 3 goods.  This P implies a specific set of returns.  Given these returns,
investors  choose a specific  investment  allocation. Intermediaries  in this subsection  simply  mimic
the investment  allocation  of equity markets. Thus, given the reduced transactions  costs, agents
choose to join intermediaries  and the savings in transactions  costs accrue to type 1 agents as a
non-distortionary  benefit.
13  See Jacklin (1987)  or Levine (1990) for more detailed treatments.  Note
that if agents are forced to deposit their savin7s in a financial intermediary
that maximizes the utility of the representative depositor, expected utility is
higher than  that with equity markets or with intermediaries  where membership is
voluntary.  See Levine (1990).31
IV. Financial Intermediaries:  Researcher/Mobilizer
Individuals  would invest more in firms if they could internalize firm externalities into
their decisions,  but there are costs associated  with researching  projects, identifying  externalities,
publicly certifying "good" projects and conveying this information to  investors, and then
mobilizing  resources from individual  investors. Although  it would be prohibitively  costly for
each individual to perform these activities, financial intermediaries may form to  research
production processes and mobilize resources to take full advantage of profitable production
opportunities. These research,  certification,  mobilization,  and coordination  functions  are similar
to the types of activities conducted  by investment banks, venture capitalists, and commercial
banks.  i
4
A. Costs, Trading, and Equilibrium
As described in Section I, the cost of researching  firms and identifying  externalities  is
Z.  Therefore, an intermediary  that collects funds from many investors can effectively  reduce
the research costs to zero  per investor.  In addition, there are costs associated  with mobilizing
resources and coordinating financing to exploit profitable projects.  Specifically,  it costs the
researcher/mobilizer r  per  investor.  Since I  assume the market for financial services is
competitive, the profits from financial intermediation must be zero in  equilibrium.  Thus,
financial  intermediaries  charge  r  per investor in equilibrium. Individuals,  however, may not
find it worthwhile  to purchase researcher/mobilizer  services.  If the extra return generated by
14  On the certification role that financial intermediaries may play when
relatively  unknown  firms  try  to  raise  capital  in a  world  with  asymmetric
information see Booth and Smith (1986)  and Megginson and Weiss (1991).  On the
monitoring role of financial intermediaries see Diamond (1984).32
these services  does not sufficiently  compensate  for the cost of purchasing these services, agents
will  not  purchase  the  financial  services  offered  by  researcher/mobilizers  and
researcher/mobilizers  will not form to provide these financial  services.
For simplicity, I examine the situation in which financial  structures already exist that
allow agents to  both diversify portfolios and manage liquidity risk such that there  is no
premature capital liquidation. In this case, investors have the choice of whether to use or not
use  researcher/mobilizer intermediaries.  Formally,  investors  can  choose  to  forgo
researcher/mobilizer  services, so that utility equals
V*  =max  - ]+  [tO(frH.)w(q;wp)f  ] Y
- y]  [7  IHtH6 2 (qwt)e  +  (1-q)wty  (20)
Or, investors  can purchase  researcher/mobilizer  services  from financial  intermediaries  and obtain
a higher returns by investing  in firms via these financial intermediaries. In this case, agents
maximize  expected utility
V+e=  max  _-q)  w  + PntRqw,  - C]-y
-Y (W)TrR¢q  +(l-f)  _(21)
im)~iR*qwc  (1-q)  w.
- qw 33
where the  superscript  "**"  designates values for  an  economy that  chooses to  create
research/mobilizer  financial  intermediaries.
Before  characterizing  the equilibrium, Proposition  2 will simplify the analysis.
proposition 2:  For a given purchase price of researcher/mobilizer  activities, ¢,
there is a threshold level of income, a,  such that when income is
above the threshold level, w  >  ',  agents choose to purchase
researcher/mobilizer  activities  because V1 >  V.
Proof:  Since (i) V  > V  when r = O,  and (ii) V'  - V is continuous  and
increasing  in w, then  for any constant r  >  0 there is a $'v where
'(R0)  = V(Pv),  so that  fo-  w > W,  V/(w) >  Vr(w).
Proposition  2 establishes  that the level of per capita income can help in determining  the
types of  financial services prcvided by  financial intermediaries.  If  per capita income is
sufficiently  high, agents choose to purchase complex  financial  services  that involve researching
firms, certifying the existence of worthy projects, and mobilizing resources to exploit fully
investment  opportunities. In economies  where per capita income is not sufficiently  high, agents
find that the additional  returns generated  by these financial  services are not worth the cost.
It  should also be pointed out that public policies may affect the cost of  financial
intermediation  and thereby affect the rate of economic  growth.  If public policies directly or
indirectly raise the cost of evaluating firms and coordinating financing for firms, this could
retard the development  of financial  intermediaries  that improve the efficiency  with which  society
allocates resources.  Thus, the  model predicts that restrictive financial policies can lower
productive  efficiency  and the rate of economic  growth.
Having established  Proposition  2, we can solve  for the equilibrium  investment  allocation
decision and per capita growth rate in an economy that chooses to create and use financial34
intermediaries  that provide researcher/mobilizer  services. Let w >  w, so that agents maximize
the problem in equation (21).  The investment  decision is
q<** =  (22)
and growth is
9;'  =  A*q**  (23)
= A*n.
B. Discussion
The economy where a financial intermediary arises that substantially augments the
informational content of  investment decisions grows  faster  than economies where  these
"icomplex"  financial intermediaries  do not arise.  This occurs because researcher/mobilizer
intermediaries  induce  a larger fraction  of resources  to be invested  ;n human capital augmenting
firms, i.e.,  q-  >  q- and q"  >  q.  By internalizing  externalities, the financial intermediary
encourages  investment  in firms that enhance  technology  and i nprove human  capital.  Since the
analysis of this "complex" financial intermediary was assumed to occur in  the presence of
financial  structures  that minimize  liquidity  and productivity  risk, no firm capital is prematurely
liquidated  and produc.ivity  risk does not discourage investors from investing in firms.
An important finding is that financial development  can be a function of the level of
income per capita.  Thus, this model partly captures the two-sided nature of the relationship35
between finance and  growth: the emergence and  development of  financial contracts and
institutions  alters investment  incentives  and firm production  processes in ways that change per
capita growth rates; and the level of economic  development  helps in determining  the types of
financial arrangements  that society chooses to construct and use.'5 One empirical prediction
that emerges from the analysis is that economies  that pass a threshold  level of income  per capita
will choose more sophisticated  financial  arrangements  and therefore grow faster.
The model also predicts that per capita growth rates are related to the types of financial
services provided by  the  financial sector: financial structures that manage liquidity and
productivity  risk, reduce transactions  costs, and augment  the information  content of investment
decisions  increase the efficient allocation of resource, the productivity  of firms, and economic
growth.  Thus, common  empirical measures  of the overall size of the financial  system may not
appropriately  capture fundamental  features of financial  development. This paper suggests that
empirical  work should focus on developing  indicators  of the provision  of financial  services, not
simply measuring  the size of the financial  system or any particular financial  institution.
15  Different  costs  structures  for  acquiring  information  and  mobilizing
resources  would  produce  different  results.  For  example,  let  the  cost  of
identifying externalities  and coordinating resources be  proportional to per
capita income, Zwt. The justification  might be that in richer, more complicated
economies, the total costs of identifying and mobilizing resources are larger.
Thus, at a cost of Zwt  an individual or agency can identify externalities and
collect resources from individuals to exploit these externalities in period t.
By sharing the cost of performing researcher/mobilizer activities among many
investors, these agencies allow society to identify and exploit fully the most
profitable projects.  Under this cost structure, the  formation of delegated
researcher/mobilizers is independent of income per capita.36
V. Conc'usion
An important  challenge  to economists  is to explain  how financial  contracts  and institutions
affect economic growth while simultaneously  explaining how economic growth elicits the
creation and modification  of financial arrangements.  This paper examines the relationship
between the evolution of financial services and long-run economic growth.  Liquidity risk,
productivity  risk, transactions  costs, and information  gathering and resource coordination  costs
create incentives  for the emergence  of financial  contracts and institutions. The level of income
per capita, public policies, and legal codes determine  the provision  of financial  services and the
types of financial stnrctures that provide these services.  The resultant financial structures  can
alter investment  incentives,  such that the steady state growth rate of per capita output increases.
In addition, the model formally  demonstrates  that the purchase and use of financial services is
not necessarily "all-or-nothing."  From the broad spectrum of available financial services,
economies  choose to construct and use financial  contracts and institutions given the level of
income per capita, public policies, and legal structures.
Growth occurs in this model when society invests and maintains  a sufficient  amount of
resources  in firms that  augment  human  capital, create technology,  and produce  goods. Increases
in the fraction of resources  av.ocated  to firms or decreases  in the premature liquidation  of firm
capital  accelerate  economic  growth. Financial  structures  that mitigate  liquidity  and productivity
risk make firm investment  more attractive.  In addition, liquidity risk management  eliminates
the premature  liquidation  of firm  capital  which  accelerates  technological  change. Thus, financial
structures that allow agents to reduce liquidity and productivity risk can increase economic
growth by increasing  the fraction  of resources invested  in firms and enhancing  the efficiency  of37
firms. Financial  structures  that identify  production  externalities  and mobilize  resources to more
fully  exploit  profitable  projects can further  enhance  growth  by raising  the proportion  of resources
devoted to human  capital augmenting  endeavors.
Taking policies toward financial markets as given exogenously, this paper can help
explain a number of empirical regularities  that have not been previously reconciled within the
context  of a single  optimizing  model. In this model, different  policies  toward financial  activities
can yield different steady-state  growth rates; these policy differences  can explain the positive
correlation  between per capita output growth and various measures  of financial  market activity;
and different financial  market policies  can simultaneously  explain why economies  will tend to
choose more sophisticated  fina'.Icial  services  as per capita  income rises, but why policy  and legal
differences  may cause the form of the financial institutions  providing those services to differ
across countries with similar per capita incomes. The focus on financ'  al services in this paper
suggests a  new emphasis for empirical investigations.  The analysis predicts that it is the
provision  of specific financial  services that will be related to long-run  growth, not necessarily
the size of the financial  system or of any particular financial  institution.38
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